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surplus production...".73 
The economic decline of the Maritimes relative to the rest of the country in the 
early 1920s is well documented. The impact of the rate increases and the loss of the 
Intercolonial was an obvious contributing factor. Of course, no one has ever 
suggested that it was the only factor. Indeed, academics in a growing body of 
literature have argued plausible cases for several other causes.74 But when a scholar 
like Larry McCann, who has reviewed that literature and is familiar with much of 
the primary material, concludes that the rate changes were a "major" factor in the 
region's decline, his judgment should not be too hastily discounted. 
Cruikshank is correct in his suggestion that we need more work on the 
Intercolonial Railway. We need specialized studies over more limited time periods 
— studies which can outline in detail the policies of particular ministers and the 
managers subordinate to them, and which can evaluate the importance of 
transportation policies in the success or failure of particular industries. Cruikshank 
has shown the wealth of primary materials available on the daily operations of the 
railway and these promise much in clarifying grey areas in our understanding. But 
we should not be beguiled by the relative richness of these sources into thinking 
that they explain the fundamental policy decisions for the road. The Intercolonial 
was a creation of government and remained subject to government policy. For the 
understanding of that policy one must often look beyond the discussions of the civil 
, servants to the decisions of cabinet and to the sometimes widely scattered bits and 
pieces of evidence which aid in reconstructing the political history of the period. 
E.R. FORBES 
With Apologies to James: A Response to E.R. Forbes 
I did say I wanted to "reactivate debate"! E.R. Forbes has launched a spirited 
defence of the conclusions he reached almost two decades ago. Indeed, he now 
appears prepared to abandon some of his earlier qualifications, arguing that the 
Intercolonial "played an even more conscious, direct and effective role in regional 
development than I previously suggested" (p. 3). In the course of his defence, Forbes 
takes issue with the arguments I developed in my 1992 Acadiensis article, "The 
Intercolonial Railway, Freight Rates, and the Maritime Economy".1 I am 
somewhat reluctant to engage in a formal debate. The intent of my article was to 
generate further research on the Intercolonial and the businesses it served, and I am 
73 Nova Scotia, Journal and Proceedings of the House of Assembly (1921), p. 360. 
74 See P.J. Wylie, "When Markets Fail: Electrification and Maritime Industrial Decline in the 1920s", 
Acadiensis, XVII, 1 (Autumn 1987), pp. 74-96; several essays in Kris Inwood, ed., Farm, Factory 
and Fortune (Fredericton, 1993) and E.R. Forbes, "Looking Backward: Reflections on the Maritime 
Experience in an Evolving Canadian Constitution", in D.J. Savoie and Ralph Winter, eds., The 
Maritime Provinces: Looking to the Future (Moncton, 1993), pp. 13-37. 
1 Ken Cruikshank, "The Intercolonial Railway, Freight Rates and the Maritime Economy", 
Acadiensis, XXII, 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 87-110. I want to thank Professor Forbes for generously 
sharing his response to my work with me. I could not ask for a more generous or considerate critic. 
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all too aware that many readers of this journal share James Forbes' view of this 
whole subject. Nevertheless, I did ask for this opportunity to clarify some of my 
arguments, and, perhaps by doing so, point to directions for further research.2 
Did the managers of the Intercolonial Railway consciously play a role in the 
economic development of the Maritimes? Rate policy on the Intercolonial, Forbes 
argues, "took shape as the pragmatic and cumulative results of the interaction 
between producers and politicians" (p. 5). If he includes the railway's managers 
with the politicians, I agree. However, I disagree that the process so described 
constituted "conscious, direct and effective" policy. No doubt every shipper in the 
Maritimes and the rest of Canada would support a "policy" of lower railway rates, 
but the actual working out of such a policy could and did lead to conflicts between 
shippers. When granting lower rates to others appeared to or did place a shipper at 
a disadvantage — when rates made the raw materials of a competitor cheaper, 
when rates favoured larger industries and merchants or when rate concessions were 
seen to limit the ability of the railway to offer other concessions — conflicts 
emerged. Conflicting and competing visions of economic development among the 
different economic regions of the Maritimes have always been minimized in Forbes' 
discussion of the Intercolonial, even though his own study of the Maritime Rights 
movement of the 1920s takes class, local and metropolitan conflicts into account. 
The extension of the Intercolonial to Montreal further complicated the interests 
with which Intercolonial managers contended; after 1898, the "region" that could 
produce revenue-generating traffic for the railway included most of Quebec up to 
and including Montreal. Montreal was not just an important destination; it was an 
important source of traffic for the Intercolonial. While strengthening connections to 
Montreal and points west, the extension also ensured that the Intercolonial's 
managers would no longer limit their concerns to representing and promoting the 
economic interests of Maritime shippers. 
More significantly, Forbes fails to consider the competitive environment within 
which Intercolonial Railway managers responded to the demands of shippers and 
politicians. This creates some confusion with respect to at least one of my 
arguments. According to Forbes, I argue that the Intercolonial was "too small and 
weak" to be an instrument of regional development (p. 10). Too small? Freight 
traffic density — the measure is ton miles per mile of line, not the freight tons per 
mile of line adopted by Forbes — is a measure of work performed by the railway; 
heavier densities are associated with economies in expenditures since the railway 
carries more freight while performing a similar amount of work. Comparatively 
"light" traffic density meant that the Intercolonial, and, I would emphasize, other 
Canadian railways, were unable to enjoy some of the economies associated with 
the new larger trains and freight cars adopted throughout North America in the late 
2 For a more extended response, see "E.R. Forbes and the Intercolonial Railway: A Rejoinder", 
unpublished paper, Business History Conference, Peterborough, October 1994.1 would like to thank 
participants at the conference, and particularly my commentator, Rosemary Oramer, for reminding 
me that something positive could come out of this debate. 
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19th and early 20th centuries.3 
What purpose is served by comparing freight density on the Intercolonial, or the 
Canadian Pacific's eastern operations or the Grand Trunk, with the freight density 
of "busy" American railroads? First, each of these railways had the ability to carry 
freight from the seaboard to the interior of North America, including Ontario and 
the West. Shippers could, and did, threaten to ship their goods via steamers and 
U.S. railways between Maritime and western interior points. Second, import and 
export rates to and from points west of Montreal were constructed as a proportion 
of freight rates between New York and Chicago.4 Shippers within the Maritimes 
could at least use those rates as a baseline for seeking concessions on their own 
rates. Yet American railways like the New York Central spent less to move a ton of 
freight by the 20th century than did railways such as the Intercolonial, so could 
better afford to offer lower rates. The Intercolonial, Grand Trunk and Canadian 
Pacific railways all had to struggle with a rate, and therefore an earnings, structure 
that, in part, was determined by these busier northeastern American railways. 
Therefore, a comparison of traffic densities on different eastern North American 
railways helps to identify differences in operations that might affect costs. The 
railways selected for comparison had some direct and indirect influence on rate 
structures in northeastern North America. In contrast, a comparison of the tons of 
freight per mile of line on the Intercolonial with that of three transcontinental 
railways serving various parts of Canada serves little purpose. The operating 
situation of the Intercolonial was not affected by shifts in the traffic densities on the 
Canadian Northern or the Canadian Pacific's western lines. 
This confusion is symptomatic of Forbes' reading of my arguments. Contrary to 
what he continues to assert, the Intercolonial's managers were not uniquely situated 
to be the leading rate setters for the Maritimes. They did not fix import and export 
rates on traffic carried to points beyond Montreal. Nor did they unilaterally set 
rates on traffic destined beyond their line. They depended upon but did not always 
get co-operation from connecting railways in arranging for special through rates 
requested by Maritime shippers. And they did face Canadian railway competition. 
The Canadian Pacific did, at times, offer lower rates than the Intercolonial on 
goods travelling west, and Intercolonial managers worked very hard, despite serious 
difficulties, to offer Maritime shippers as timely delivery as the Canadian Pacific 
could offer.5 As well, the Intercolonial's managers did face competition from water 
carriers. Some long and shorter distance special rates on the Intercolonial were set 
in response both to the real and potential competition of water carriers. Like the 
Grand Trunk in Ontario and Quebec, the Intercolonial was open to competition 
from water carriers on most parts of its line, which had the effect of keeping a 
3 For these arguments applied to other railways, see Ken Cruikshank, "Managing A Fragile North 
American Industry: The Canadian Railway Problem Revisited", unpublished paper presented to the 
Canadian Business History Conference, Victoria, March 1988. 
4 Cruikshank, "Managing a Fragile North American Industry", p. 11. 
5 For examples of the Canadian Pacific offering lower rates, see David Pottinger to Collingwood 
Schreiber, 9 March 1891, Pottinger to A.G. Blair, 24 June 1897, Pottinger to D.G. Jones, 2 May 
1900, Records of the Canadian National Railways System, RG 30, National Archives of Canada 
[NAC]. 
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number of rates low. Finally, they did face United States rail competition. Coastal 
water carriers could connect Maritime shippers with Boston, and therefore with the 
America rail system, as an alternative route. 
As for the local standard tariff of rates adopted by the Intercolonial, which was 
lower than anywhere else in Canada, its origins are less clear than Forbes contends. 
In 1876, the government of Alexander Mackenzie appears to have opted for an older 
tariff, after having briefly introduced a tariff of rates similar to those established on 
other railways two years earlier. The decision to lower standard rates, then, was not 
initiated by Charles Tupper, and cannot be readily linked to the National Policy of 
the Macdonald government and the establishment of new industries in the 
Maritimes in the early 1880s. 
Forbes asks why, if the Intercolonial was not the rate setter, rates on the 
Intercolonial did not change until after the change in management of the railway? 
But, the Intercolonial's managers did begin to advance some of those local rates 
under their control, as early as 1905. For the most part, however, the Intercolonial's 
managers followed changes being made elsewhere. The elimination of the lower 
westbound freight rates from Maritime points to stations west of Montreal occurred 
in 1908 because of changes ordered by the Board of Railway Commissioners on 
rates between Montreal and southwestern Ontario. Most of the other increases on 
the Intercolonial took place at a time when all North American railways were 
advancing their rates, beginning in 1915 and peaking in 1920. Some of the 
advances sought by other railways after 1915 appear to have been related to 
changes in the freight rates offered by water carriers.6 If anything, the general 
pattern of rate changes underlines the importance of situating the Intercolonial in 
the northeastern transportation network. 
There is a danger in seeing rate structures on the Intercolonial or on other 
railways simply as neat and rational responses to competitive pressures. On all 
railways, shippers attempted to use their economic or political bargaining power to 
win special concessions. This was particularly true on the government-operated 
Intercolonial, although we should not forget how dependent many private railways 
were on political goodwill. Moreover, local freight officials also came under 
pressure and sometimes misjudged the seriousness of water or other competitive 
influences. There always was "political" bargaining over freight rates between 
shippers and various railway and government officials. Once in place, railway rates 
often outlived the competitive or other influences that had originally produced 
them. It was always difficult to get rid of special rates once they were introduced. 
By the early 20th century, facing difficulties in capturing economies of traffic 
densities, freight officials on the Intercolonial believed that some of their rates, 
including the local tariff and the lower westbound than eastbound rates between the 
Maritimes and Montreal, had long outlived whatever initial rationale had governed 
them. In making changes, they had to negotiate with shippers and politicians; but 
they also responded to changes in the complex eastern North American rate 
6 On the rate advances, see Ken Cruikshank, Close Ties: Railways, Government and the Board of 
Railway Commissioners, 1851-1933 (Montreal, 1991), pp. 127-55 
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structure, which neither the politicians nor the Intercolonial's managers controlled. 
In my article, I tried to document the freight rate changes on the Intercolonial in 
more detail, in order to improve upon H.A. Argo's comparison of the standard 
tariff rate in different regions. I hoped to show the changing situation facing 
shippers from different regions, competing in similar markets, using the actual 
competitive rates existing between these major urban centres. Since only small and 
infrequent shippers living in small towns and villages in any region of Canada 
would have used the standard tariffs to ship goods 700 miles, Argo's graph affords 
little insight concerning the reality of long haul rates. 
I also asked the question, what did the Intercolonial railway do? Historians have 
largely accepted the idea, consistent with the ideals of the promoters of the railway, 
that the Intercolonial promoted interregional trade. So I looked at a range of 
statistical evidence on freight traffic, some of which I summarized in my article. 
My main intent was modest: to raise questions about any simple linking of freight 
rate changes and economic development. Admittedly, the Intercolonial's traffic is a 
very crude measure of the impact of freight rate changes on the Maritime economy. 
So why bother? For the most part, the previous arguments about the impact of rate 
changes have been based on the testimony of business leaders who appeared in 
railway commission cases in the 1920s, seeking a reduction in railway rates.? One 
problem with this evidence ought to be obvious; manufacturers had a vested interest 
in showing that the rate increases had been damaging to their business. Moreover, 
those manufacturers who measured their "freight burden" for the railway 
commission, did so by applying pre- and postwar freight rates to their 1920s 
shipments. None indicated whether the level of freight they were shipping west of 
Montreal by the early 1920s had increased, decreased or changed at all. Nor were 
they precise about the proportion of their business that these shipments represented. 
We cannot tell whether trade via the Intercolonial with the rest of Canada always 
had been an important part of their business, or whether it had become more 
important as a result of wartime opportunities or the growing problems in local 
markets. I would argue that the absolute increase in through freight and decline in 
local traffic after 1919 indicated in my original graph at least makes the latter 
proposition worth exploring. 
At its core, Forbes' argument rests on two observations: freight rates increased 
after World War I and during the same period Maritime businesses encountered 
difficulties. Is there a connection? Perhaps for some industries. Forbes cites my 
research on the sugar industry to try to document the connection between freight rate 
increases and business difficulties. Yet it does not support his case. Atlantic Sugar, 
established during World War I, appears to have been exceptionally active in its 
efforts to penetrate markets beyond the Maritimes; most accounts indicate that, 
whatever the rates, the older Acadia refinery had been content to serve the regional 
market. And although the special rate on sugar was eliminated in the spring of 
1919, Atlantic Sugar continued to carry on a vigorous trade beyond the Maritimes 
7 As well as Forbes' works, see L.D. McCann, "The Mercantile-Industrial Transition in the Metal 
Towns of Pictou County, 1857-1931", Acadiensis, X, 2 (Spring 1981), pp. 29-64. 
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throughout that year. Atlantic Sugar almost went bankrupt in the fall of 1919, but 
there is little contemporary evidence that would suggest that the firm's financial 
difficulties had anything to do with operating — particularly freight transportation 
— costs. Similarly, there is no particular evidence to suggest that the infamous 
decision of the Montreal-based Canadian Car and Foundry Company to close its 
Amherst branch was related to freight transportation costs. 
The statistics I used, therefore, were an attempt to overcome some of the 
difficulties with the evidence currently available on the impact of freight rate 
changes. And I think Forbes is correct in pointing out that the one graph I chose to 
use from the various ones produced in my original conference paper, and which I 
regret has been reproduced yet again, may obscure what I actually say about 
through and local traffic in the text of my article. In response to Forbes' critique, I 
offer Figure 1.1. I have made four changes. This graph begins with the fiscal year 
1898-99, the first full year of operation to Montreal. I agree that trade between the 
Maritimes and Montreal may have been significant, although I can find few ways 
to prove it. Forbes estimates that at least two-thirds of what had been previously 
"through" traffic was deemed "local" traffic after 1899. This estimate would be 
more persuasive if there were some corresponding downward shift or significant 
change in the pattern of through traffic, however temporary. Instead, as I think both 
Forbes' table and my original graph suggest, local and through traffic patterns 
remained comparable before and after 1899. It would be equally logical to argue 
that Montreal became a more important destination for freight after 1899, since 
then the Intercolonial finally had more control over the freight rates offered to 
shippers. This would account for the relatively strong performance of "local" freight 
after 1899. That performance, however, may also testify to the vitality of the local 
trading economy within the Maritimes in this period. 
In Figure 1.1, I have eliminated coal traffic from consideration, because the 
large local traffic in this weighty commodity may exaggerate the volume of local 
traffic after 1899. I do not, however, accept the argument that through traffic was 
composed mainly of high value, manufactured products. We simply do not know 
what proportion of through railway freight was composed of pulpwood, lumber or 
other forest products, which generally accounted for 25 per cent of all freight on the 
Intercolonial. For example, "through" pulpwood and lumber shipments, often 
originating on the Quebec portions of the Intercolonial and destined for New 
England factories, were regularly blamed for creating freight car shortages on the 
Intercolonial.» I have also eliminated through eastbound grain traffic, as well as 
both through and local imports and exports of European goods, via the ports of 
Halifax and Saint John. I have done so in order to improve the ability of "through" 
traffic to provide a reasonable, if somewhat crude, measure of traffic from stations 
on the Intercolonial to points beyond its line, mainly west and south of Montreal or 
Saint John, and for "local" traffic to offer some guide to the amount of traffic 
8 See, for example, David Pottinger to L.W. Donnelley, Traffic Mngr, United Box Board and Paper 
Co., New York, 29 Oct. 1904, p. 125, Pottinger to C.B. Hibbard, GM, Quebec Southern Ry, 
Montreal, 1 Nov. 1904, p. 294, vol. 12068, Pottinger to D.W. Sanborn, Boston & Maine RR, 22 
Nov. 1905, p. 720, RG 30, vol. 12073, NAC. 
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Figure 1.1 
Intercolonial Railway, 1899-1916 
Selected Local and Through Freight Traffic 
Local 
Through 
1899 1903 1908 1912 1916 
Year 
Note: Freight Traffic Excluded from Graph: Local and Through Coal, 
Merchandise Exports to and Imports from Europe via Halifax and 
Saint John, Grain Exports via Halifax and Saint John 
Source: Annual Reports, Department of Railways and Canals, 1900-1917 
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carried between stations on the Intercolonial. Finally, in order to encompass 
thesemore detailed changes, I have had to conclude the graph in the fiscal year 
1915-16, when such statistics stop being available. 
The resulting Figure 1.1 demonstrates that through traffic grew rather slowly 
after the extension to Montreal, and, as importantly for the case I was making, its 
growth appears to have been unaffected by the readjustment of freight rates between 
the Maritimes and Ontario that began to take effect in 1908. Forbes contends that 
"in the context of the period, half a million tons, or, by 1911, a million tons, of 
freight was a substantial volume to be moving between the Maritimes and Ontario 
on a single railway" (p. 11). He then offers a series of comparisons, including 
comparisons with the amount of freight carried by the Canadian Northern Railway 
in 1903, at a time when that railway did not operate a fully developed system. 
Although I am not sure how useful such an exercise is, half a million tons, or one 
million tons, amounts to about four to six per cent of the total freight carried by 
either the Grand Trunk or the Canadian Pacific in 1903 or 1911 respectively.91 
originally chose a comparison with the canals, thinking that it gave some 
indication of the amount of traffic flowing through a similar transportation corridor 
directly west of Montreal. 
Of course, from the point of view of individual firms, one million tons does 
represent a substantial volume of freight. In 1919, Atlantic Sugar sold 41 thousand 
tons of sugar in Ontario and points west, an amount that represented 42 per cent of 
the total output of the firm.io In 1921, the Enterprise Foundry Company shipped 
1.32 thousand tons of stoves to the Prairie West and British Columbia, Ganong's 
sent 1.3 thousand tons of confectionery goods to Ontario and western Canada, n So 
I do not want to be misunderstood as minimizing the importance of one million 
tons. But to me it seems more important that, in a decade of dynamic growth, 
between 1900 and 1910, there was relatively slow growth in through traffic, a good 
proportion of which would be freight from points on the Intercolonial to points in 
Ontario and further west. And it is, I think, equally significant that freight traffic 
patterns, at least prior to 1916, seem unaffected by changes in the rate structure. 
There are real limits to what these or any other numbers can tell us. 
Nevertheless, I remain convinced that the numbers raise some legitimate questions 
about attempts to link freight rates and economic difficulties in the Maritimes, and 
about our images of the role played by the Intercolonial in trade between the region 
and central Canadian points. My 1992 article was intended as an invitation to be 
sceptical of, not to dismiss, the Maritime Rights freight rate thesis. 
Where can this debate take us? The debate over economic development needs 
more insights from the study of individual Maritime firms and industrial sectors. 
9 Calculated from statistics in Tables B.2, B.3, "Appendix B: Statistics on Railway Freight 
Operations", Cruikshank, Close Ties, pp. 219-20. 
10 Ken Cruikshank, "Taking the Bitter with the Sweet: Sugar Refiners and the Canadian Regulatory 
State, 1904-20", Canadian Historical Review, LXXIV, 3 (September 1993), Tables I and II. 
11 Exhibits File, Application of Governments of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to Board of 
Railway Commissioners, January 1922, Records of the Canadian Transport Commission, RG 46, 
vol. 618, file #30531, NAC. 
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How significant were Ontario or Montreal or American or local markets to different 
Maritime industries? Did the significance of the markets, and therefore of freight 
transportation costs, change at all? Where did industries acquire their raw 
materials? A number of manufacturers in the 1920s complained of the increases in 
eastbound freight rates on iron and steel materials from Ontario. Was this 
importation of key materials a traditional, or a new, development? Further, the 
debate over transportation needs to be widened to consider the other parts of the 
transportation network of the Maritime provinces. What role did coastal and other 
water carriers play in assisting Maritime businesses in acquiring and shipping 
materials, and were there significant changes in their role? Then, too, the debate 
over the role of the Intercolonial needs to be extended geographically to consider the 
railway's presence in, and impact on, important regions of the province of Quebec. 
Finally, the debate over the role of the Intercolonial needs to be extended 
thematically, to consider the other ways, beyond offering freight transportation, 
that the railway may have contributed to the social and economic development of 
the regions it served. I would like to think that the current debate has shed a little 
light; nevertheless, this particular tunnel, which promises to lead us to a better 
understanding of the general process of economic development, is still pretty dark. 
And it will remain dark if either Forbes' or my own arguments remain unrevised 
and unquestioned. 
KEN CRUIKSHANK 
